Abstract: This paper analyzes global dynamics in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with housing-wealth effects. It demonstrates that monetary policy cannot burst rational bubbles in the housing market. Under monetary policy rules of the Taylor-type, there exist global self-fulfilling paths of house prices along a heteroclinic orbit connecting multiple equilibria. From bifurcation analysis, the orbit features a boom (bust) in house prices when monetary policy is more (less) active. The paper also proves that booms or busts cannot be ruled out by interest-rate feedback rules responding to both inflation and house prices.
Introduction
The interaction between monetary policy and house prices is a central topic for current policy-oriented macroeconomic analysis, but still under-investigated in the context of general equilibrium models whereby nonlinear dynamics are explicitly considered. The objective of this paper is to characterize analytically global house-price dynamics under alternative monetary policy regimes in an overlapping generations setting that exhibits housing-wealth effects on aggregate consumption.
Theoretical developments in monetary economics over the last decades have focused on monetary policy rules capable of ensuring macroeconomic stability. Since the inflationary experience of the 1970s, central banks and academics have tried to design simple rules that promote the credibility and transparency of monetary policy-making. Since the seminal work by Taylor (1993) , a large body of research has emphasized the stabilizing properties of active monetary policy rules, whereby the central bank responds to increases in inflation with a more than one-to-one increase in the nominal interest rate.
1 Empirical studies have shown that an active monetary policy stance mimics the Federal Reserve's behavior after 1979, over the VolckerGreenspan period (e.g. Judd and Rudebusch 1998; Taylor 1999b; Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000) . 2 More recently, however, Meltzer (2011) and Taylor (2012) advocate a distinction between a "rules-based era", from 1985 to 2003, and an "ad hoc era", from 2003 onwards. Over the rules-based era, a period characterized by inflation stabilization, the Federal Reserve's policy is well described by a simple Taylor rule whereby the Federal Funds Rate is set as a linear function of the inflation rate and the output gap with coefficients of 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. Over the ad hoc era, a period devastated by the boom and bust in the housing market, the Federal Reserve's policy deviates from the Taylor rule.
In particular, from 2002 to 2006 the Federal Funds Rate was 2-3 percentage points below the path prescribed by the Taylor rule for any period since 1980s (Poole 2007; Taylor 2007 ). Significant downward interestrate gaps from the Taylor rule also occurred over the same period in the OECD countries as a group (Ahrend, Cournède, and Price 2008) . Leamer (2007) and Taylor (2007 Taylor ( , 2011 argue that such a "Great Deviation" from rules-based policy making, resulting in a too accommodating monetary stance, was a major cause of the economic and financial crisis erupted in 2007, since it triggered boom-bust dynamics in house prices.
Could the rules-based approach to monetary policy be powerful enough to avoid the possibility of houseprice instabilities? To undertake the question analytically, in this paper we examine the implications of the Taylor-rule framework in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model of the type originally shown in the seminal paper by Yaari (1965) , then further developed by Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989) , and here extended, for our purposes, in order to incorporate housing in the asset menu. The resulting overlapping generations setting proves to be a convenient framework for making aggregate demand sensitive to housing wealth and for formalizing transparently the interactions between house-price dynamics and rules-based monetary policies.
We analyze the global dynamics of the model and demonstrate that the rules-based approach relying on Taylor-style interest rate policies is powerless to burst rational bubbles in the housing market, consisting in self-fulfilling upward trajectories in house prices compatible with the optimal behavior by forward-looking agents. In particular, we show that global dynamics associated to arbitrary revisions in house-price expectations typically follow a heteroclinic orbit connecting multiple equilibria.
The central point formalized in the paper is that global house-price paths critically interact with both off-target inflation paths and the stance of monetary policy. A boom in house prices, originating in the neighborhood of the target steady state due to a revision in expectations unrelated to the economy's fundamentals, stimulates aggregate demand and thus inflation via the positive wealth effect on aggregate consumption. Under the Taylor-rule framework, which fights inflation aggressively, the resulting increase in the real interest rate makes the economy spiral down into an off-target decelerating-inflation path. Thus, house-price bubbles in conjunction with the Taylor rule cause the system to converge to a liquidity trap equilibrium, with the nominal interest rate approaching asymptotically to zero.
From bifurcation analysis, we demonstrate that the heteroclinic orbit features a boom (bust) in house prices when monetary policy is more (less) active. Along a liquidity-trap path, indeed, a monetary authority adopting Taylor-type prescriptions tries to stimulate aggregate demand and therefore inflation by decreasing the nominal interest rate more than proportionally with the decline in inflation. Nevertheless, if the interest rate cuts are predicted to be sufficiently aggressive, house prices will increase over time, even along a selffulfilling decelerating-inflation trajectory.
More general specifications of the policy rules reinforce the essence of our results. Remarkably, we prove that booms or busts cannot be ruled out by interest-rate feedback rules responding to both inflation and house prices. In particular, we show that reacting to house-price inflation more than to consumer-price inflation generates a basin of attraction to the liquidity trap and even leads to local indeterminacy at the steadystate equilibrium away from the trap.
The next Section sets forth the paper's connections with the literature. Section 3 presents the model and the monetary regimes. Section 3 analyzes the issue of global equilibrium dynamics under the baseline Taylorrule framework. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case of monetary policy rules directly reacting to house prices. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature
The present paper is linked to both empirical and theoretical literature. Empirical evidence by Campbell and Cocco (2007) , Muellbauer (2007) , Dvornak and Kohler (2007) , and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) finds highly significant housing-wealth effects on consumption. However, the link between house prices and consumption dynamics is typically overlooked in standard frameworks for monetary policy analysis (e.g. Taylor 1999a; Woodford 2003; Galí 2008) . In this paper we intend to consider a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which housing-wealth effects do affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Using a New Keynesian model with households' borrowing constraints, Iacoviello (2005) examines the role of house prices for the business cycle and the design of optimal monetary policy.
3 Consistently with the business cycle literature, the approach relies on local dynamics, thereby abstracting from global nonlinearities and possible multiplicities of steady-state equilibria. This paper is different in two respects. First, we present an alternative way to analyze the implications of house prices for monetary policy design, since we employ an overlapping generations model. 4 Second, a central focus of this paper is to depart from local analysis and focus on global nonlinear dynamics. Therefore, following Cochrane (2011) , we use the criterion of global determinacy to evaluate the connection between monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability.
Theoretical works by Uribe (2001, 2002) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2009) show that once global dynamics are taken into account, the usual local properties of Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1999b -type interest-rate feedback rules in terms of inflation stabilization disappear. In particular, Taylor rules give rise to multiple self-fulfilling decelerating inflation paths converging to a long-run equilibrium around which the monetary authority is no longer capable to ensure aggregate stability. However, the framework of analysis, based on the traditional infinite-horizon representative agent setup, diverges from our purposes, since from the standard Euler equation aggregate demand dynamics only depend on real interest rates. The present paper contributes to the foregoing literature in two important dimensions. First, in order to incorporate housing-wealth effects and investigate the implied global dynamics, we shall relax the single infinitely-lived representative agent paradigm and develop a monetary framework with overlapping generations à la Yaari (1965 )-Blanchard (1985 )-Weil (1989 . In this way, aggregate demand dynamics will depend not only on real interest rates, but also on housing wealth. As a consequence, monetary policy decisions will affect aggregate demand and inflation through their effects on both the real interest rate and house prices. Our theoretical setting enables us to highlight a number of unexplored consequences in terms of global dynamics under Taylor rules. For example, bifurcation analysis shows that, when interest-rate feedback policies are sufficiently aggressive, bubbles in house prices may occur even in conjunction with decelerating dynamics in the inflation rate. Second, as a related matter, the model with housing-wealth effects derived in this paper constitutes a useful theoretical benchmark to investigate the dynamic properties of monetary policy feedback rules in which the nominal interest rate reacts not only to inflation but also to house prices. Galí (2014) shows the possible occurrence of rational bubbles in asset prices irrespectively of monetary policy within a two-period overlapping generations model based on Samuelson (1958) and extended to incorporate nominal rigidities. Within this setting, he also finds that "leaning against the wind" through real interest rate increases in the attempt to offset a bubble in asset prices is likely to exacerbate the bubble component itself. This feature may take place regardless of the level of asset prices. That is, the level of asset prices could fall because of depression of the fundamental component despite an expanding bubble. Our investigation complements Galí (2014)'s in several important dimensions. First, the monetary version of the Yaari (1965 )-Blanchard (1985 )-Weil (1989 setup with infinite generations developed in this paper is intended to make our analysis strictly comparable with the canonical single infinitely-lived representative agent framework, commonly used for addressing the dynamic effects of monetary policy rules (e.g. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 2001). Second, differently from Galí (2014), we focus on the consequences of house-price dynamics in a framework which explicitly account for housing-wealth effects. Third, while Galí (2014) studies the impact of monetary policy on bubble dynamics by log-linearizing the model's equilibrium conditions around one particular steady state and by examining the resulting system of difference equations, the present paper is centered on nonlinear dynamics and the existence of heteroclinic orbits connecting different steady states. Forth, we study equilibrium dynamics under alternative feedback interest rate rules. From this perspective, for example, we demonstrate how reacting to the rate of growth as opposed to the level of housing prices may critically alter both local and global properties. He, Wright, and Zhu (2015) demonstrate the existence of bubbles in house prices in an economic environment à la Lagos and Wright (2005) extended to internalize liquidity premia associated to house equity as collateral. In their model, collateral provided by houses enables decentralized trade in the presence of incentive problems arising from the anonymity of traders in some transactions. Importantly, the occurrence of bubbles linked to the fact that houses expand liquidity appear to apply also in an extended setting with money and banking. Differently from He, Wright, and Zhu (2015) , and consistently with the purpose stated in the Introduction, the present paper aims to elucidate the interactions between feedback interest rate rules of the Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1999b )-style and house-price dynamics. In order to show how nonlinear dynamics can render Taylor rules easily unable to burst rational bubbles in the housing market, we lay out a simple continuous-time macroeconomic environment with housing-wealth effects on aggregate demand, along the lines suggested by a fairly well-established empirical evidence.
The model
Consider the following monetary version of the Yaari (1965 )-Blanchard (1985 )-Weil (1989 overlapping generations setup, extended to incorporate housing in the agents' asset menu. Each individual faces a common and constant instantaneous probability of death, μ > 0. Population grows at a constant rate n. At each instant t a new generation is born. The birth rate is β = n+μ. Let N(t) denote population at time t, with N(0) = 1. So the size of the generation born at time t is βN(t) = βe nt , and the size of the surviving cohort born at time s ≤ t is βN(s)e Blanchard (1985) , there is no dynastic altruism. Financial wealth of newly born individuals is therefore zero. Agents supply one unit of labor inelastically, which is transformed one-for-one into output.
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The representative agent of the generation born at time s ≤ 0 chooses the time path of consumption, c̅ (s, t), real money balances, m̅ (s, t), and housing, h ̅ (s, t), in order to maximize the expected lifetime utility function given by 0 0
[ log ( ( , ), ( , ) ) ( 1 )log ( , ) ]
,
t E c s t m s t h s t e dt
where E 0 is the expectation operator conditional on period 0 information, ρ > 0 is the pure rate of time preference, and Λ(·) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and linearly homogenous function. Consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth complements (Reis 2007) , that is, Λ cm > 0, and the elasticity of substitution between the two is lower than unity (Cushing 1999) . Because the probability at time 0 of surviving at time t ≥ 0 is e −μt , the expected lifetime utility function (1) is
t c s t m s t h s t e dt
Individuals accumulate their financial assets, a̅ (s, t), in the form of real money balances, interest bearing public bonds, b ̅ (s, t), and housing-wealth, q(t)h ̅ (s, t), where q(t) is the relative house price. Therefore, a̅ (s, t) = b ̅ (s, t)+m̅ (s, t)+q(t)h ̅ (s, t). The instantaneous budget constraint is given by
q t a s t R t t a s t y s t s t c s t R t m s t R t t q t h s t q t
where R(t) is the nominal interest rate, π(t) is the inflation rate, τ̅ (s, t) are real lump-sum taxes, and μa̅ (s, t) is an actuarial fair payment that individuals receive from a perfectly competitive life insurance company in exchange for their financial wealth at the time of death, in the spirit of Yaari (1965) . 6 Notice that, since the asset menu includes housing equity, in the present overlapping generations setup the Yaary-Blanchard-type premia associated to the actuarially fair scheme imply the occurrence of reverse mortgage (Eschtruth and Tran 2001) .
Agents are prevented from engaging in Ponzi's games, so that
Letting z̅ (s, t) denote total consumption at time t for the agent born at time s, defined as physical consumption plus the interest forgone on real money holdings, the individual optimizing problem can thus be solved using a two-stage procedure. 
In the first stage, consumers solve an intratemporal problem of choosing the efficient allocation between consumption, c̅ (s, t), and real money balances, m̅ (s, t), in order to maximize function Λ(·), for a given level of total consumption, z̅ (s, t). Optimality implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real money balances must equal the nominal interest rate,
Because preferences are linearly homogenous, this optimality condition assumes the following form:
where Γ′(R) > 0. In the second stage, individuals solve an intertemporal problem of choosing the optimal time paths of total consumption, z̅ (s, t), and housing, h ̅ (s, t), in order to maximize their lifetime utility function (2), given the constraints (3), (4) and the optimal condition (6).
8 Optimality yields
Substituting the optimality condition (8) into the instantaneous budget constraint (3), integrating forward, applying the transversality condition (9), and using the law of motion of total consumption (7), we can express total consumption as a linear function of total wealth:
where
denotes human wealth, defined as the present discounted value of after-tax labor income. From (5), (6), and (10), it also follows that
6 Insurance companies collect financial assets from deceased individuals and pay fair premia to current generations. The presence of the life insurance market precludes the possibility for individuals of passing away leaving unintended bequests to their heirs. Assuming actuarial bonds issued by financial intermediaries would yield equivalent results. See Blanchard (1985) . 7 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) . In the context of the Yaari-Blanchard framework, see Marini and Van der Ploeg (1988) . 8 See Appendix A for analytical details.
Combining next (5), (6) and (7), we obtain the optimal time path of individual consumption:
where L(R)≡1+R/Γ(R) and L′(R) > 0. According to (12), the optimal consumption growth rate is identical across all generations.
The latter properties are verified, for example, if we assume that Λ(c̅ , m̅ ) is a CES function.
Aggregation and fiscal policy
We can now derive the evolution of aggregate variables. 
t X t e x s t e ds
Suppose that each agent faces identical age-independent income and tax flows, so that y̅ (s, t) = y̅ (t) and τ̅ (s, t) = τ̅ (t), as in Blanchard (1985) . Using a̅ (t, t) = 0 and c̅
, the budget constraint, the optimal time path of consumption, the optimal time path of house prices, and the transversality condition expressed in per capita terms are, respectively, of the form
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From (14), the rate of change of per capita consumption depends on the level of financial wealth a(t), since future cohorts' consumption is not valued by agents currently alive. In particular, older generations are wealthier than younger generations, and so consume more and save less. Only in the limiting case in which the birth rate β is equal to zero, per capita consumption dynamics follows the standard Euler equation prevailing in the infinitely-lived representative agent paradigm. The flow budget constraint of the government in per capita terms is given by
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). b t m t R t t n b t t t m t
To concentrate on the implications of housing-wealth effects, the government is assumed to adopt a tax policy consisting in balancing the budget at all times. It then follows that taxes are such that
9 See Appendix B for analytical details.
Monetary policy rules
To close the model, one needs to specify the monetary policy regime. We shall consider first the case in which the monetary authority follows a conventional Taylor rule, controlling R(t) according to a feedback rule of the form
where T(·) is a continuous, strictly increasing and strictly positive function. Monetary policy is active when T′(π(t)) > 1 and passive when T′(π(t)) < 1. In particular, we may assume, as advocated by Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1999b , a linear rule such as
where r  and π  are the central bank's targets for the real interest rate and the inflation rate, and γ > 0 is the policy parameter featuring an active monetary policy. We shall also consider alternative rules controlling for both general price inflation and the housing price level,
where , 0, q >  ε or controlling for both general price and housing price inflations,
where δ > 0.
Equilibrium
Total output y̅ (t) and housing supply h ̅ (t) s are assumed to grow at the constant rate n, without loss of generality. It follows that per capita output and housing are constant and can be normalized to one, y(t) = y = h s = 1, for analytical convenience. Equilibrium in the goods market requires that c(t) = y = 1. Equilibrium in the housing market requires that h(t) = h s = 1. The balanced budget rule implies ( ) ( ) 0, b t m t + =   so that total government liabilities are constant over time, b(t)+m(t) = l, where l is a constant. For analytical convenience, we can study the dynamic properties of the model normalizing the constant l to zero.
Using the law of motion of per capita consumption (14), the equilibrium real interest rate is given by
Then, the nominal interest rate dynamics are given by
From (15), house price dynamics are given by
The equilibrium dynamic system is completed by introducing a monetary policy rule. Consider a generic rule as
where ( , , / ) Tπ  is increasing and additively separable in all its components. We can solve equation (26) for π to get
( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )/ ( )). t P R t q t q t q t
An active policy is such that ∂T/∂π > 1, which implies that 0 < ∂P/∂R < 1 for any ( , , / ). R To be an equilibrium, the paths (R(t), q(t), π(t)) t∈ [0,∞) , solving equations (24), (25) and (27), should verify the no-Ponzi game and the transversality conditions.
Dynamics under the Taylor-rule framework
We analyze initially local and global equilibrium dynamics under the baseline Taylor-rule framework.
Steady-state and local dynamics
A generic conventional Taylor rule implies π = P(R) = T −1 (R), where 0 < P′(R) < 1. We can rewrite the system (24)- (25) as
Equilibrium steady states are bounded values for R and q, such that the transversality condition (16) holds. Hence lim t→∞ (R(t)-P(R(t))+μ) > 0. Defining
and observing that r * > ρ > 0, the following proposition holds. 
Proposition 1 Assume a conventional Taylor rule in which monetary policy is globally active. Then: (a) if
and 1 { : 
and (c) 
which tends to be verified when the long-run real interest rate r * , the inflation target , π  the elasticity of substitution between real money balances and consumption, and/or the monetary policy feedback parameter γ are sufficiently large.
Explore now local equilibrium dynamics. Linearizing equations (28) and (29) in the neighborhood of any point (R, q), we obtain the Jacobian
The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are
We readily observe that
Hence, the following proposition holds.
10 For the case of a linear rule à la Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1999b , we can determine 1 R * explicitly. Substituting equation (20) yields
In this case, a necessary condition for the existence of two steady states is (1 ) . r r γ γπ γπ * + − > > 11 Therefore, the relationship between the house prices for the two possible long-run nominal interest rates depends upon the long-run real interest rate, the degree of substitutability between real money balances and consumption, and the characteristics of the Taylor rule. As a result, even in the presence of housing-wealth effects, an active monetary policy stance in the spirit of Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1999b exhibits the usual property of local determinacy. In particular, in the neighborhood of 1 1 ( , ), R q * * and in the absence of exogenous fundamental shocks, the only equilibrium path is 1 ( ) , R t R * = and 1 ( ) . q t q * = Nevertheless, in a small neighborhood around the steady state in which R * = 0, local indeterminacy applies, i.e. there exist infinite equilibrium paths of R(t) and q(t) converging asymptotically to the steady state: for any initial R(0) there exists a q(0) such that the time paths of R(t) and q(t) satisfying the system (28)-(29) will converge asymptotically to that steady state. As this is a singular steady state, in the sense that the eigenvalues for system (R, q) are infinite, the speed of approach is locally very high. Singular steady states appear in economic theory from the existence of static constraints in some macroeconomic models, as in Leeper and Sims (1994) , and Barnett and He (2004 , 2006 . However, in our case, the singularity has a different nature: it is related to the properties of function Γ(R), since when R tends to zero the relationship between consumption and money demand becomes locally insensitive to the nominal interest rate. This type of singularity seems not to have been examined previously and can only be analyzed by investigating global dynamics.
Proposition 2 Let the assumptions in Proposition

Global dynamics
We now conduct a global dynamics analysis of the effects of the baseline Taylor-rule framework. Thereafter, we shall investigate whether changing the Taylor rule by incorporating the housing prices significantly modifies the dynamics. This implies that the nominal interest rate follows a non-monotonous trajectory in the case depicted in Figure 1 . The boom in house prices stimulates aggregate demand and thus inflation via the positive wealth effect on aggregate consumption. However, the aggressive increase in the real interest rate implied by the Taylor rule makes the economy spiral down into an off-target decelerating-inflation path, leading the economy to the liquidity trap equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Let the assumptions in Proposition
As a consequence of Proposition 3, there is not only local indeterminacy at the steady state 0 ( , 0), q * but also global indeterminacy: any point along the heteroclinic orbit is an equilibrium and, if it is not located at any of the two steady states, there is a transition dynamics which converges asymptotically to the liquidity trap.
Next, we set out the analytical rationale for our results. The isocline 0 q=  has just one branch, q = Ψ(R), while the isocline 0 R=  has two branches, R = 0 and q = Φ(R). The slopes of the last two equations are, respectively,
and
With the assumptions made at Proposition 1, the isocline 0 q=  has a positive value at R = 0 and an asymptote at this point, because q = Ψ(0) > 0 if P(0) < 0 and Ψ′(0) = Ψ(0)(L′(0)+(1-P′(0))/P(0)) = +∞. On the other side, Ψ′(∞) = 0. For positive nominal interest rates, the slope depends upon the relationship between the wealth effect on consumption and the monetary rule. The schedule has a negative slope everywhere if
. This is the case depicted in Figure 1 . However, if this condition does not hold, that is locally L′(R)/L(R) > (1-P′(R)/(R-P(R)), the two isoclines are locally increasing. This is the case depicted in Figure 2 . Let us consider the following example: if the monetary rule is linear and Λ(c, m) is a CES function,
with 0 < η, ζ < 1, the first case occurs if
. There are two cases. First, if γ > 1-ζ, the isocline 0 q=  is locally increasing. Second, if γ < 1-ζ, the isocline 0 q=  may (not) be locally increasing, for an active Taylor rule, if the target for the real interest rate is relatively high (low), the target for the inflation rate is relatively low (high), and/or the degree of reactiveness of the nominal interest rate to inflation is relatively low (high).
If the first case occurs, then we always have 1 0 .* * < In the second case, we may have 1 0 ,* * > depending upon the deep parameters for the consumer demand and the monetary rule. A necessary condition for 1 0* * > is that locally Ψ′(R) > 0.
The equilibrium point R * = 0 always exists and is, geometrically, in the intersection of isocline 0 q=  with the first branch of isocline 0.
R= 
The second equilibrium point, which exists under the conditions of Proposition 1, is in the intersection of the isocline 0 q=  with the second branch of the isocline 0, R=  whose slope is given by equation (38). For the range in which q > 0, we have Φ(R) > 0, which means that the branch of the isocline, in which q = Φ(R), is globally increasing. Since ( , ), R q * * which was introduced in Proposition 1, is P(0)+r + > 0, implying that Ψ(0)-Φ(0) > 0, which means that the isocline 0 q=  cuts the q-axis above the isocline 0.
In Proposition 2, we proved that this steady state is locally a source. Furthermore, we may conjecture that the unstable manifold associated to the equilibrium point + ⊆ W R In our case, Ω corresponds to the set of all the equilibrium values for the nominal interest rate and house prices. All other points, in W/Ω, lead to a violation of the transversality and/or the no-Ponzi game condition.
This means that there is global indeterminacy: any initial point (R(0), q(0))∈Ω is an equilibrium point and converges asymptotically to 0 (0, ). q * Condition (35) implies that if the monetary policy is more (less) active, then the reduction of the nominal interest rate is correlated with an increase (decrease) in the prices of houses. Along a liquidity-trap path, in fact, the central bank adopting the Taylor-rule framework tries to stimulate aggregate demand and thus inflation by decreasing the nominal interest rate more than proportionally with the decline in inflation. This policy triggers a fall in the real interest rate. If the interest rate cuts are sufficiently aggressive, house prices will increase even along the decelerating-inflation trajectory, as it emerges from the bifurcation diagram in Figure 3 .
Inspection of the bifurcation diagram reveals that the above depicted global indeterminacy result is robust with respect to alternative quarterly parameterizations, which appear to be widely consistent with a fairly well-established empirical evidence on interest rate policy rules (see, for instance, Judd and Rudebusch 1998; Taylor 1999b; Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000) .
Dynamics under alternative Taylor rules
In this section we extend our analysis by examining local and global equilibrium dynamics for the case of Taylor rules that incorporate house prices.
Taylor rule depending on the level of housing prices
For the case of rule (21), we have π = P(R, q), where
with (0, 0) ( )/(1 ). P r q ≡ γπ− − +γ    ε Hence, the dynamic system assumes the form 
( ) ( ( ) ( ( ), ( )) )( ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ), q t R t P R t q t q t R t q t
= − −Ψ (41)
( ) ( ) ( ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ), ( ( )) R t R t q t q t L R t
where Ψ(R, q) and Φ(R, q) are as in equations (30) and (31), in which P(R) is substituted by P(R, q) as in equation (40). This case does not present substantial changes as regards the conventional Taylor rule, as we shall see in the following Proposition. (21) in which the monetary policy is active, meaning that 0 < ∂P/∂R < 1, and define Figure 4 ). There is a heteroclinic orbit connecting equilibria
Proposition 4 Assume a modified Taylor rule depending on the level of housing prices as in equation
The only combinations of equilibrium nominal interest rates and housing prices are those along the orbit, which means that there is global indeterminacy.
Therefore, this Taylor rule does not change qualitatively the dynamics, but only quantitatively. However, since (0, 0) 1
can have any sign, although it has all parameters positive, the definition of the target values is less stringent than in the case of the conventional Taylor rule. Furthermore, we can exclude the case in which there is a unique steady state equilibrium 1 1 ( , ).
R q * *
That is, the equilibrium with a zero nominal interest rate always exists.
Taylor rule depending on the rate of growth of housing prices
For the case of rule (22), the inflation rate becomes a function of the rate of change of housing prices,
R t r q t q t t
+γπ− −δ π = +γ    and the general equilibrium dynamic system is ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ( )) ), 1
R t r q t q t R t
where Ψ(R) and Φ(R) are similar to equations (30) and (31),
Therefore, we can state the following proposition. (34) and (33). From now on, consider the the values for the parameters such that there are two steady state equilibria. The associated phase diagrams are given in Figure 5 , for the case in which 1+γ > δ, and in Figure 6 , for the case in which 1+γ < δ. If δ < 1+γ, whereby the central bank reacts more to consumer-price inflation than to house-price inflation, the global dynamics is similar to the version of the model with a conventional Taylor rule (see Figure 5) : there is global indeterminacy in the sense that there is an interval for initial values of R,
Proposition 5 Let the same assumptions as in Proposition
which are equilibrium values and the nominal interest rate tends (possibly in a non-monotonous way) to the steady state R * = 0. For a given initial value of the nominal interest rate in that interval, there is a single initial value for the equilibrium house prices. Next, the pair (R(t), q(t)) will follow along the heteroclinic orbit Ω converging to 0 (0, ). q * If δ > 1+γ, whereby the central bank reacts more to house-price inflation than to consumer-price inflation, the global dynamics changes substantially (see Figure 6 ): the two steady-state equilibria are both locally and globally indeterminate. In particular, the steady state
is locally indeterminate of order one and the steady state
is locally indeterminate of order two. The orders of indeterminacy are given by the dimension of the local stable manifolds. Globally, the stable sub-manifold associated to equilibrium (0), (0)) , s R q W ∈ then the equilibrium trajectory will converge to 1 1 ( , ).
R q * *
This means that if we have an initial nominal interest rate R(0)≠0, there will be one single initial value q(0), say q 1 (0), such that the pair (R(t), q(t)) will converge to the steady state 1 1 ( , ), R q * * but an infinite number of initial values q(0) > q 1 (0) such that (R(t), q(t)) will converge to the steady state implies that there is an infinite number of initial equilibrium values for q(0), given R(0), and not just one as in the version with a conventional Taylor rule.
Conclusions
The alleged connection between monetary policy making and the dynamics of house prices arguably has been one of the most debated topics in recent years. The Federal Reserve's accommodating monetary policy of 2002-2006 -the so-called Great Deviation from the Taylor rule -is claimed to be responsible for the global crisis started in 2007, since it generated boom-bust patterns in house prices. In this paper we have presented an overlapping generations economy with housing-wealth effects and demonstrated that house-price instabilities can well occur even if the central bank follows monetary policy feedback rules of the Taylor-style. We have proved that global equilibrium dynamics satisfying agents' forward-looking optimal choices follow, in general, a heteroclinic orbit connecting multiple steady-state equilibria. Specifically, rules-based monetary policies, even when they aim to fight aggressively booms or busts in house prices, can well induce off-target self-fulfilling trajectories in both house prices and inflation, which typically converge to a liquidity trap equilibrium. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that reacting to house-price inflation more than to consumer-price inflation gives rise to a basin of attraction to the liquidity trap, and introduces local indeterminacy at the off-trap steady state. Bifurcation analysis reveals that, along a liquidity-trap path, a central bank adopting an excessively aggressive monetary policy conforming to the Taylor principle may bring about an off-target self-fulfilling boom in house prices, even if the economy is spiraling down into a decelerating inflation dynamics. Therefore, the theoretical results shown in this paper provide analytical foundations for the view that active monetary policy, per se, is not viable in order to prevent the occurrence of bubbles in the housing market.
The framework we have examined delivers our key points in a direct way. Of course, the analysis presented in this paper is based on simplifying assumptions needed to render our arguments as transparent as possible. ( , ). R q The figure is built by assuming the same functional forms and the same parameters as in Figure 1 , and δ = 5 > 1+γ.
First, we have abstracted from the presence of price stickiness. Under sticky prices, however, the implied sluggish adjustments associated to the presence of a Phillips curve do not alter the essence of the analysiswhich is primarily focused on the interactions between house-price dynamics and rules-based monetary policies from a global perspective -in any fundamental dimension.
Second, we have abstracted from issues pertaining to optimal monetary policy. It is worth emphasizing that, differently from the single infinitely-lived representative agent paradigm, in the present overlapping generations setup the dynamics of real assets triggers redistributions of wealth across generations, thereby affecting social welfare. The implications in terms of optimal fiscal policy are analyzed by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) . In a monetary setup, however, one should further take into account that increases in consumer-price inflation negatively influence intergenerational equity, for they cause a redistribution of real wealth from current to future generations. Conversely, increases in housing-price inflation bring about intergenerational redistributions in favor of current generations. A formal analysis about the consequences of such intergenerational features in terms of optimal monetary policy design -following the lines suggested by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) -is beyond the scope of the present paper, and may arguably constitute a challenging issue for future research. The overlapping generations monetary setup we have presented here could then be used as a fruitful benchmark for this purpose.
Third, we have abstracted from direct empirical estimates of the model. Empirical questions aimed to establish, say, whether the class of models studied here actually fits well the U.S. economy in and around 2003 when the Great Deviation took place, and whether the quantitative requirements for global indeterminacy under the Taylor rule -and augmented Taylor rules -were met during that period are left to future research.
In the intertemporal optimization problem, the representative consumer born at time s chooses the optimal time path of total consumption, z̅ (s, t), to maximize the lifetime utility function (2), given (6) and the constraints (3) and (4). Using the definition of total consumption, z̅ (s, t)≡c̅ (s, t)+R(t)m̅ (s, t), and the optimal intratemporal condition (6), we can write
is the same for all generations. Therefore, the intertemporal optimization problem can be formalized in the following terms:
[ (log ( ) log ( , ) ) ( 1 )log ( , ) ] ,
t z s t h s t t z s t h s t e dt
subject to
q t a s t R t t a s t y s t s t z s t Rt t q t h s t q t
and given a̅ (s, 0). The optimality conditions are
Therefore, the individual budget constraint (51) can be expressed as
.
q t a s t R t t a s t y s t s t z s t Rt t q t h s t q t R t t a s t y s t z s t z s t R t t a s t y s t z s t
Integrating forward (55), using the transversality condition (54) and (52), total consumption turns out to be a linear function of total wealth:
where k ̅ (s, t) is human wealth, defined as the present discounted value of after-tax labor income,
L(R(t))≡1+R(t)/Γ(R(t)). Time-differentiating (57) yields ( , ) ( ( )) ( , ) ( ) ( ( )) ( , ). z s t L R t c s t R t L R t c s t
Therefore, the dynamic equation for individual consumption is
L R t R t c s t R t t c s t c s t L R t
′ = −π −ρ −  (59)
Appendix B. Aggregation
The per capita aggregate financial wealth is given by
t s t a t a s t e ds
Differentiating with respect to time yields
a t a t t a t a s t e ds
where a̅ (t, t) is equal to zero by assumption. Using (3) yields
q t a t a t a t R t t a t y t t c t R t m t R t t q t h t q t q t R t t n a t y t t c t R t m t Rt t q t h t q t
Using (11), the per capita aggregate consumption is given by
is the per capita aggregate human wealth. Next differentiate with respect to time the definition of per capita aggregate consumption, to obtain
t s t c t c t t c t c s t e ds
Note that c̅ (t, t) denotes consumption of the newborn generation. Since a̅ (t, t) = 0, from (11) we have
Using (12), (63) and (65) into (64) yields the time path of per capita aggregate consumption: (0))P * = ≡Ψ − −α α which constitute indeed an equilibrium point only if P(0) < 0. In this case, the transversality condition is verified, because the condition -P(0) > -μ always holds. Second, from the condition q = Ψ(R) = Φ(R), there is a second candidate if the set {R ≥ 0:Ψ(R) = Φ(R) > 0} is non-empty. We have and r = R-P(R) > -μ from the transversality condition. Because β(1-α)(ρ+μ) > 0, then r + > ρ > 0 > r -. As L(R) > 1, then the condition r > ρ must hold, which implies that the transversality condition is always met. Therefore, an equivalent condition for the existence of a second steady state is 1 { 0: ( ) }. R R R P R r * + = ≥ − = From the assumption that the monetary policy is globally active, R-P(R) is monotonically increasing in R, which means that R-P(R)∈ [-P(0) , +∞). Therefore, the steady state 
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2
For the steady-state equilibrium 1 1 ( , ) ( , ), R q R q * * * * = we have the trace and determinant of the Jacobian given by
yielding the eigenvalues λ 1 = 2r * -ρ > 0 and 2 
Recall that this steady state exists only if P(0) < 0, and observe that L′(0) = ∞ and L″(0)/(L′(0))
which means that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are infinite and the steady state is singular. If P(0)+r + > 0, the steady state is multiple (case (b) in Proposition 2) and is a kind of non-regular saddle point, and, if P(0)+r + < 0, the steady state is unique (case (c) in Proposition 2) and is a kind of non-regular source. In any case, the flow approaches or diverges from
at an infinite speed and is non-differentiable locally.
In order to study local dynamics, we can use several methods, such as, first, finding a de-singularized projection and studying its local dynamics, and, second, studying global dynamics.
If we use the first method, the natural way to remove the singularity introduced by L′(R) at R = 0, would be to recast the system in variables (L, q),
is increasing and R(1) = 0, R′(1) = 0. However, in this case there is an unique steady state
Therefore, this method does not solve our de-singularization problem. We use the second method in the proof of Proposition 3. There, we show that the singular steady state 
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 3
As the system (28)- (29) does not have an explicit solution, we must employ qualitative methods in order to study global dynamics. One possible method is to find a first integral of system (28)- (29), that is, a Lyapunov function V(·) such that V(R, q) = constant. We could not find this function. Another method is to determine a trapping area for the heteroclinic orbit. The rationale is the following: as the steady state
is a source, the unstable manifold is the set is a saddle point, the stable manifold is, locally, composed by a single trajectory belonging to ℝ + ; therefore there is an intersection of the unstable manifold of the first point and of the stable manifold of the second which is non-empty. In order to prove that it exists, and to characterize it, we consider a trapping area for the heteroclinic orbit. In order to prove this, we start by determining the slopes of the heteroclinic orbit in the neighborhoods of the two equilibria, we build a trapping area enclosing the heteroclinic, and demonstrate that all the trajectories starting inside the trapping area escape from it, with the exception of those starting at any point along the heteroclinic orbit.
Appendix E.1. Slopes of the eigenspaces associated to the two equilibria
The unstable eigenspace 1 u E is the tangent space to the unstable manifold associated to equilibrium 1 1 ( , ), R q * * in the space where
The unstable eigenspace 1 u E is the linear space which is tangent to 1 u W and is spanned by the eigenvectors (V 1 , 1)  and (V 2 , 1)  which are associated to eigenvalues λ 1 and λ 2 , respectively, where E E the eigenspace related to the dominant (non-dominant) eigenvalue. The following conditions can be proved: (1) if
which is equivalent to λ 1 > λ 2 , and therefore 1,
In this case, V 1 < 0 and V 2 > 0 and the slope associated to the dominant eigenvalue is negative and the slope associated to the we have to take a different approach: observe that, as R′(1) = 0, then a naïve calculation for the slope of the stable manifold in the neighborhood of the singular equilibria could be dq/dR = (r + -ρ)/(αβ(ρ+μ)R′(1)) = ∞.
Instead, observe that along the singular surface R = 0 we have 0 R=  and (0)( (0) ). q P q = Ψ −  Then, from any point along this surface where
an unstable trajectory unfolds. This means that any trajectory coming from R > 0 will be deflected away from the equilibrium point on hitting the surface R = 0, with the exception of the one which converges to the equilibrium point
The (global) direction of the vector field generated by equations (28)- (29) is given by
In order to determine the slope of the trajectory which converges to the singular steady state, we determine the slope of the vector field hitting the surface R = 0 using equation (67). We have 
. Trapping area
Next we consider the case in which λ 1 < λ 2 , which is depicted in Figure 1 . Recall that Ω is tangent to a line dq/dR = 0 in the neighborhood of point
Observe that, in the neighborhood of point 1 1
( , ), R q * * the slope of the eigenspace associated to the non-dominant eigenvalue (λ 1 ) and of the isocline 0 R=  are both positive, but the former is less steep that the later because (see Figure 7 )
As the heteroclinic Ω is tangent to that eigenspace in the heighborhood of that equilibrium point, it will lie between the isocline 0 R=  and 1, u − E and will never cross this line. This allows to consider the trapping area whose sides are given by the segment of the isocline 0 q=  between the two equilibria (recall that the two equilibria lay along this isocline), by a line passing through the steady state 1 1 ( , ), R q * * whose slope is given by the eigenvector which is associated to the non-dominant eigenvalue and by the horizontal segment such that (67), which is generated by equations (28)- (29), allows us to prove that all the trajectories hitting the three boundaries of the trapping exit the trapping area.
At side (A, B) we have 0 q=  and 0, R<  because ( , ) ( )( ( )( ( ))( ( )) ( ( ) )( ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ) ( )( ( ))(
( ( ) )( ( ( )) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ) ( )( ( ))( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ( ) )( ( )( ( Therefore, there is an unique trajectory starting from point B, 1 1 ( , ), R q * * that does not hits the boundaries of the trapping area, and therefore converges to point A,
q * This is the heteroclinic trajectory Ω, and it happens to cross the isocline 0. R= 
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 4
We use the same methods as for the proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
First, the steady-state conditions are q = Ψ(R, q) and R = 0 or q = Φ(R, q), and a steady state is an equilibrium if R * -P(R * , q * )+μ > 0. A steady state exists and is an equilibrium if there is a q * > 0 such that q * = Ψ(0, q * ) and -P(0, q * ) > -μ. Using the Taylor rule (21), the equilibrium condition is equivalent to (q-q + )(q-q -) = 0, where then the transversality condition holds without further conditions. An interior steady state is determined from the non-negative values of (R, q) such that q = Ψ(R, q) = Φ(R, q) > 0. If we define r(R, q)≡R-P(R, q), this condition is equivalent to (r-r + )(r-r -) = 0. As a necessary condition for a positive q is r(R, q) > ρ, then r(R, q) = r + > -μ, which means that the transversality condition is automatically verified. This is equivalent to γR+εq = (1+γ)(P(0, 0)+r + ). Substituting in q = Ψ(R, q), we get the equation 
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 5
It is easy to see that the steady state conditions are exactly the same as in the case of the conventional Taylor rule. The only thing that may change is related to the local and global dynamics of the model. Applying the same methods as for the proof of Proposition 2, we find the eigenvalues for the steady state 
